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WHO WILL PROTECT OUR STUDENTS IF 
THE CONSTITUTION CAN’T?: AN 
EXAMINATION OF DUE PROCESS 
PROTECTIONS FOR BULLIED STUDENTS 
IN MORROW v. BALASKI 
PATRICK DRISCOLL* 
Abstract: On June 5, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting 
en banc, concluded that the Morrow family failed to state a claim against their 
school district for failing to protect their daughters from harm sustained by a school 
bully. By dismissing the Morrows’ suit, the Third Circuit failed to hold schools ac-
countable for violence against students under their watch. Worse still, the majori-
ty’s holding incentivized inaction by school administrators even though they are 
uniquely positioned to protect bullied students. Judge Julio M. Fuentes, in his dis-
sent, found that Blackhawk High School had coercive control of their students such 
that a special relationship, and therefore a duty to protect, existed. The failure of the 
Third Circuit to adopt this reasoning left students vulnerable to school bullying 
while shielding schools from liability. 
INTRODUCTION 
In October 2008, Assistant Principal Barry Balaski of Blackhawk High 
School could no longer ensure the safety of Brittany and Emily Morrow.1 
Throughout the preceding ten months, the Morrow girls suffered verbal and 
physical assaults at the hands of a school bully, Shaquana Anderson.2 Neither 
criminal charges nor stay-away orders stopped the bullying or sparked the school 
into taking protective action.3 Instead, Assistant Principal Balaski and the school 
district recommended to Deirdre and Bradley Morrow, Brittany and Emily’s par-
ents, that they enroll their children in a different school.4 As a result of Assistant 
Principal Balaski and the Blackhawk School District’s failure to protect Brittany 
and Emily, the Morrows filed suit on behalf of their daughters, alleging that the 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2014–2015. 
 1 Morrow v. Balaski, (Morrow I), No. 10-292, 2011 WL 915863, *1, *2 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 
2011) aff’d en banc, 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 2 Id. at *1–2. The bullying included Anderson pushing Brittany Morrow down a flight of stairs, 
elbowing her in the throat at a school football game, and verbally accosting her with names such as 
“cracker” and “retarded.” Id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 Id. 
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school violated the girls’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to 
liberty.5 The Morrows included a supplemental suit for negligence and gross and 
willful misconduct against Balaski.6 They argued that Pennsylvania had a duty 
to protect Brittany and Emily under two narrow exceptions to the general rule 
that states have no affirmative duty to protect citizens from private harm.7 The 
State is compelled to protect its citizens when (1) it is in a special relationship 
with an individual or (2) State actors created the danger that led to harm.8 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed 
the Morrows’ suit for failing to prove that Pennsylvania owed a duty to protect 
under the “special relationship” or “state-created danger” exceptions.9 Sitting en 
banc, a majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the 
lower court’s decision despite the judges being divided on the issue of the exist-
ence of a special relationship between the school and its students.10 In affirming 
the district court’s decision, the Third Circuit held that the Morrows failed to 
establish the existence of either a special relationship or a state-created danger.11 
Although the Morrows had not met their burden, the majority and dissent agreed 
that if a special relationship had been proven to have existed, then the school 
district would have been required to protect the students’ Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.12 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the factual background and circum-
stances that led to the Morrows’ suit. Part II then recounts the history of the Mor-
rows’ civil case. Finally, Part III explores the Third Circuit’s dissent and argues 
that courts should find a special relationship between a school district and its 
students under certain limited circumstances in order to protect students from the 
violence and harassment of bullying. By failing to hold schools accountable for 
violence done to students, the Third Circuit created an incentive for school ad-
ministrators to pursue inaction even though they are uniquely situated to protect 
their students. 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Morrow v. Balaski (Morrow II), 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir.), 
en banc, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013). 
 6 Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 165. The family brought the “negligence and/or gross or willful miscon-
duct” claim as supplemental state law claim. Id. 
 7 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *5–6. Generally, states have no affirmative duty to protect citi-
zens from private harm. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). 
 8 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *6. 
 9 Id. at *6–7. 
 10 Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 164; id. at 193 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 11 Id. at 164. 
 12 Id. at 167. 
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I. BULLYING, CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, AND SCHOOL INACTION 
Brittany and Emily Morrow were ninth and tenth grade students in good 
standing in the Blackhawk School District when they were subjected to a string 
of threats, acts of racial intimidation, physical assaults, and attacks at the hands 
of their peer, Shaquana Anderson.13 The harassment, which began on January 4, 
2008, included threats made through various modes of communication and so-
cial media.14 On January 5, 2008, Anderson threatened Brittany with bodily 
harm through a post on Anderson’s MySpace blog page.15 Later that day, Ander-
son left a voicemail on Brittany’s home phone, threatening both Brittany and her 
sister Emily.16 
Just two days later, on January 7, 2008, Anderson physically attacked Brit-
tany in the school lunchroom.17 At the recommendation of Assistant Principal 
Balaski, Brittany’s mother reported the attack to the police.18 The local Chippe-
wa Township Police Department charged Anderson with simple assault.19 Due to 
the school’s “No Tolerance” policy, both Anderson and Brittany received a three-
day suspension.20 Anderson served the suspension, but was not expelled.21 
The attacks continued several weeks later, when on January 29, 2008, An-
derson attempted to throw Brittany down a flight of stairs at Blackhawk High 
School.22 Anderson verbally accosted Brittany, calling her a “cracker” and “re-
tarded.”23 She told Brittany she “had better learn to fight back” and asked her, 
“why don’t you learn to talk right[?]”24 
On April 9, 2008, the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County, Juvenile 
Division, placed Anderson on probation and ordered her to avoid all contact, 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Morrow v. Balaski, (Morrow I), No. 10-292, 2011 WL 915863, *1, *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 
2011) aff’d en banc, 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. MySpace is a website that permits users to create personal profiles and share information, 
including videos and pictures, with other users in an online community. Morrow v. Balaski (Morrow 
II), 719 F.3d 160, 164 n.4 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013) (citing Doe v. 
MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 845 (W.D. Tex. 2007)). 
 16 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *1. Anderson was later charged by the White Township Police 
Department with terroristic threats and harassment. Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. The school’s “No Tolerance” policy punished both the aggressor and non-aggressor without 
regard to fault. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Morrow v. Balaski, 82 U.S.L.W. 3122 (2013) 
(No. 13-302), 2013 WL 4822221 [hereinafter Petition for a Writ of Certiorari]. 
 21 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *1. 
 22 Id. at *2. 
 23 Id. The term “cracker” is generally used in a derogatory manner to describe Caucasian people. 
Traditionally, the term was applied to rural, non-elite white southerners. John A. Burrison, Crackers, 
NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA, (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/arts-culture/
crackers. 
 24 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *2 (internal quotations omitted). 
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direct and indirect, with Brittany Morrow.25 Both the school district and Assis-
tant Principal Balaski received copies of the stay-away order.26 Despite the or-
der, Anderson remained a student at Blackhawk High School and continued to 
have contact with Brittany Morrow.27 
On September 9, 2008, the Juvenile Master of the Court of Common Pleas 
of Beaver County adjudicated Anderson as delinquent based on the simple as-
sault charge filed by the Chippewa Township Police Department in January 
2008.28 Anderson received a second court order directing her not to have any 
contact, direct or indirect, with Brittany Morrow.29 Once again, both the school 
district and Assistant Principal Balaski received copies of the court order.30 Dur-
ing this time, the school had a disciplinary code in place that required removal of 
students who engage in certain criminal behavior.31 
On September 12, 2008, the school allowed Anderson to board Brittany 
Morrow’s bus, even though the bus did not service Anderson’s home route.32 
While on board, Anderson threatened to attack Brittany.33 Later that evening, at 
a school district football game, Anderson elbowed Brittany in the throat.34 On 
September 16, 2008, in another attack ultimately reported to the school district 
and Assistant Principal Balaski, Anderson’s friend Abbey Harris struck Emily 
Morrow in the throat.35 
Following that attack, Mr. and Mrs. Morrow met with representatives of the 
school district and Assistant Principal Balaski.36 Balaski informed the Morrows 
that the school district “could not guarantee the safety” of their daughters.37 He 
further advised the Morrows to “consider another school.”38 Blackhawk High 
School refused to protect the Morrows, so in October 2008 Bradley and Deirdre 
Morrow removed their daughters from the dangerous environment at Blackhawk 
High School and enrolled them elsewhere.39 The plight of the Morrows exposed 
the lack of constitutional protections for the liberty rights of victims of bullying 
                                                                                                                           
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. Anderson was initially charged with simple assault for physically attacking Brittany in the 
school lunchroom on January 7, 2008. Id. at *1. 
 29 Id. at *2. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. The school’s disciplinary code stated that certain criminal behavior, including assault and 
battery, “always require[s] administrative action resulting in the immediate removal from school.” 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 24, at 3. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See Morrow II, 719 F.3d. at 187 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863 at *2. 
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in the public school system, as well as the absence of accountability for the 
school districts involved.40 
II. FROM THE PRINCIPAL’S OFFICE TO THE THIRD CIRCUIT:  
THE MORROWS ALLEGE THAT THE BLACKHAWK  
SCHOOL DISTRICT HAD A DUTY TO PROTECT 
Bradley and Deirdre Morrow, individually and on behalf of their daughters, 
Emily and Brittany, sued the Blackhawk School District and Assistant Principal 
Balaski in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.41 The 
Morrows brought a constitutional claim against Blackhawk School District and 
Assistant Principal Balaski under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.42 
A. District Court Dismisses the Morrows’ Claim for Failing to Prove the 
State Had an Affirmative Obligation to Protect 
The Morrows sued the Blackhawk School District and Assistant Principal 
Balaski under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of Brittany and Emily’s 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights to “life, liberty, or proper-
ty.”43 Section 1983 provides a claim for private individuals against State actors, 
for violation of rights created by the Constitution.44 To state a claim for relief 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the oppressive con-
duct was perpetrated by a person or entity acting under the color of state law.45 
The Morrows needed to prove that the school denied them their substantive due 
process right to liberty by failing to protect the girls from Anderson.46 
Generally, the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose an affirmative duty 
on the State to protect individuals from private harm.47 There are, however, two 
exceptions to that general rule.48 A State’s duty to protect its citizens from the 
acts of other private citizens arises from: a “special relationship” with the State; 
                                                                                                                           
 40 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 187 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 41 See Morrow v. Balaski (Morrow II), 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 824 (2013). 
 42 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 165. Section 1983 states, in relevant part, that 
a person, acting on behalf of the state, who deprives any citizen of their constitutional “rights, privi-
leges, or immunities” shall be held liable to the injured party. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 43 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Morrow v. Balaski, (Morrow I), No. 10-
292, 2011 WL 915863, *1, *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2011) aff’d en banc, 719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 44 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *4. Section 1983 does not create rights independent of the 
rights granted by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *4. 
 45 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *4. 
 46 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *4. 
 47 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 
U.S. 189, 197 (1989); Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *4. 
 48 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *6. 
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or as a result of a “state-created danger.”49 The Morrows pursued both excep-
tions.50 First, the Morrows argued that a special relationship arose out of the 
school district’s coercive power over its students.51 Additionally, the Morrows 
contended that under the state-created danger theory a duty to protect their 
daughters existed because the school district ignored their own school code and 
allowed Anderson to return to school after her suspension.52 
The district court dismissed the Morrows’ complaint with prejudice for 
their failure to prove that a special relationship existed or that the State had cre-
ated the danger present.53 First, the district court did not recognize the custodial 
relationship that was needed to find a special relationship and resulting duty to 
protect.54 The district court noted that schools have limited control over stu-
dents.55 The court reasoned that public schools are open institutions, and at the 
end of the day, students return home to the care of their parents or guardians.56 
The court found that a special relationship arises only from situations of incar-
ceration or institutionalization.57 Second, according to the district court, the Mor-
rows did not show sufficient facts to meet the state-created danger exception.58 
In order to meet this exception, the Morrows needed to prove that the State, act-
ing through school administrators, created or exacerbated the harm faced by 
Emily and Brittany.59 The court found that the Morrows were unable to demon-
strate that a State actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a manner that 
made Emily and Brittany more susceptible to harm.60 Rather, the Morrows simp-
                                                                                                                           
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at *4, *6. 
 51 Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 165; see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199–200. The DeShaney court held 
that: 
[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the 
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for 
his safety and general well-being . . . . The rationale for this principle is simple enough: 
when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liber-
ty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide 
for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable 
safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amend-
ment and the Due Process Clause. 
489 U.S. at 199–200 (citations omitted). 
 52 Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 165; id. at 196 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 24, at 3. 
 53 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *6, *7. 
 54 Id. at *6. 
 55 See id. at *6. 
 56 Id. The court reasoned that since children remain residents of their parents’ homes and are not 
physically restrained from leaving school during the day, schools are “open institutions.” Id. 
 57 See Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 444–45 (3d Cir. 2006); Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, 
at *6. 
 58 Morrow I, 2011 WL 915863, at *6. 
 59 Id. at *5. 
 60 Id. 
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ly showed that the Blackhawk School District had taken no action at all.61 The 
district court found that omissions, or lack of action, are insufficient for culpabil-
ity under the state-created danger theory.62 
B. The Third Circuit’s Examination of Whether a Special Relationship Exists 
Between Schools and Their Students 
The Morrows appealed the district court’s decision to the Third Circuit, 
which, sitting en banc, affirmed the lower court’s decision.63 The Third Circuit 
majority and dissent were divided primarily with respect to the existence of a 
special relationship between the school and its students.64 Five judges, in a dis-
senting opinion authored by Judge Julio M. Fuentes, argued that the district court 
should have found that a special relationship existed under the unique circum-
stances of the Morrows’ case.65 The Morrow majority, however, held that the 
plaintiffs had not proven the existence of either the special relationship or state-
created danger exceptions.66 In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services and a prior Third Circuit case, D.R. by L.R. v. Middle 
Bucks Area Vocational Technical School.67 
In DeShaney, a mother filed suit against the State of Wisconsin for not pro-
tecting her child when the State returned the child to his abusive father.68 The 
Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, but it carved out a “special relation-
ship” exception that provided circumstances in which a State could be responsi-
ble for affirmatively caring for and protecting individuals from harm caused by 
private citizens.69 The narrow exception was limited to circumstances in which 
the State maintained physical custody of a person against his or her will, specifi-
cally in scenarios of incarceration and institutionalization.70 Brittany and Emily 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. 
 62 See id.; see also Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281–82 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding 
that it is misuse of state’s authority rather than failure to use it that may violate due process). 
 63 Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 164, 165. A Third Circuit panel heard oral argument on January 9, 
2012, before granting en banc review. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 24, at 5. 
 64 See Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 164; id. at 193 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 65 Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 193 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 66 Id. at 177, 179 (majority opinion). 
 67 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197; Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 166, 168; D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks 
Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1366 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 68 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192–93; Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 166–67. 
 69 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198; Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 167. 
 70 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (concluding that the protections of the Due Process Clause are only 
triggered by the State’s affirmative act of restraint on an individual’s freedom in one of three situa-
tions: (1) incarceration; (2) institutionalization; or (3) similar restraint of personal liberty); Morrow II, 
719 F.3d at 167. 
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were neither incarcerated nor institutionalized, so the Morrow majority held that 
they could not claim relief under these DeShaney categories.71 
The DeShaney court also identified a third category of control that gave rise 
to a special relationship.72 The Court held that if, through an examination of the 
totality of the circumstances, the physical control exerted by the State was of a 
similar degree to the control exerted in situations of incarceration or institution-
alization, a special relationship may be found to exist.73 In Morrow, the Third 
Circuit therefore focused on whether the Morrows were under a degree of con-
trol similar to incarceration or institutionalization, but ultimately concluded that 
they were not.74 To examine the degree of control exerted by the State in a pub-
lic school context, the Third Circuit turned to its own precedent in Middle Bucks, 
which transformed DeShaney’s totality of the circumstances analysis into an 
“all-or-nothing” approach.75 Middle Bucks held that, generally the type of physi-
cal custody necessary to create a special relationship did not exist in public 
schools despite compulsory school attendance laws and the exercise of in loco 
parentis authority because parents remain the students’ primary caretakers.76 
While the Morrow majority conceded that a special relationship between “a par-
ticular school and particular students under certain unique and narrow circum-
stances” could give rise to a special relationship, the majority held that such cir-
cumstances were not present in the Morrows’ case and failed to provide further 
guidance on what exactly would constitute such “unique and narrow circum-
stances” that could create a special relationship.77 
The five dissenting justices argued that there was a special relationship and 
therefore that the school had a duty to protect Brittany and Emily.78 The dissent 
attacked the legal foundation of the majority opinion as well as its application of 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; see Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 168, 170. 
 72 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; see Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 168. 
 73 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 168. 
 74 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; see Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 177. 
 75 Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 188–89 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; Mid-
dle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1370. To bridge the gap between the totality of the circumstances approach of 
DeShaney and the “all-or-nothing approach” adopted by Middle Bucks, the Middle Bucks court relied 
on Philadelphia Police & Fire Ass’n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. Philadelphia, which failed to 
find a special relationship with an individual who was under some supervision by the state but lived at 
his own home. Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 189 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); see Phila. Police & Fire Ass’n for 
Handicapped Children, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 874 F.2d 156, 168 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 76 See Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 169; Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1377 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that a functional custody should create a special relationship that imposes a constitutional 
duty). Pennsylvania law declares that in loco parentis provides school officials with the same authori-
ty as the students’ parents in regards to conduct and behavior. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1317 
(West 2014). 
 77 See Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 171; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 
(1995) (stating that, as a general matter, public schools do not “have such a degree of control over 
children as to give rise to a constitutional ‘duty to protect’”). 
 78 Morrow II, 719 F.3d at 193 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
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the law to the facts.79 Each dissenter, including Judge Thomas L. Ambro who 
concurred in part, argued that there was a special relationship under the specific 
circumstances of the case.80 Judge Fuentes’s dissent highlighted the importance 
of protecting vulnerable students from harms that are out of their control due to 
the coercive power of public schools.81 
III. SCHOOLS’ COERCIVE POWER OVER STUDENTS SHOULD CREATE A 
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND STUDENT 
A constitutional duty to protect should be imposed on schools in limited 
circumstances where the coercive control exerted by the school obliterates stu-
dents’ ability to protect themselves.82 The Morrow majority was misguided on 
two fronts.83 First, the legal standard adopted by the majority was based on un-
founded inferential leaps, and second, their analysis demonstrated a misapplica-
tion of the law to the facts of the case.84 The Morrow girls had a special relation-
ship with their school because of compulsory attendance laws, the existence of 
restraining orders issued by the courts, the lack of school supervision over the 
students while under the school’s custody and control, and the school’s enforce-
ment of a “No Tolerance” Policy.85 The Third Circuit majority opinion failed to 
protect the Morrows who, under the circumstances, were not permitted to protect 
themselves.86 
Ostensibly, the Morrow majority left the door open for a future court to find 
a special relationship in a public school context.87 The reality, however, is that 
the majority’s narrow reading left little room in an already narrow exception to 
find such a relationship in a public school context.88 The Morrow holding signif-
icantly strips away accountability for school administrators who are uniquely 
situated to protect students.89 
Judge Fuentes argued in his dissent that the majority should have found a 
special relationship, and that it failed to do so because it relied too heavily on 
Middle Bucks, a case that demonstrated a clear misunderstanding of DeShaney.90 
                                                                                                                           
 79 Id. at 187. 
 80 Id. at 186, 193. 
 81 See id. at 190, 191. 
 82 See Morrow v. Balaski (Morrow II), 719 F.3d 160, 188, 193 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Fuentes, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 824 (2013). 
 83 See id. at 187. 
 84 See id. at 187, 189. 
 85 Id. at 193. 
 86 See id. at 187. 
 87 Id. at 171 (majority opinion). 
 88 See id. 
 89 See id. at 187 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). 
 90 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989); Morrow II, 719 
F.3d at 188 (Fuentes, J., dissenting); D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 
972 F.2d 1364, 1379 (3d Cir. 1992) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). 
34 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 35:E. Supp. 
The central premise of Middle Bucks is that a student, unlike a prisoner, is not 
under severe and continuous restraint.91 As Judge Fuentes pointed out, DeShaney 
never advocated for an “all-or-nothing” approach.92 The focus of DeShaney was 
instead on the ability of the victimized individual to care for him- or herself.93 
The majority’s leap to an all-or- nothing approach is dangerous because it is un-
likely that any student can ever meet a standard of absolute physical custody in a 
public school context.94 A student’s complaint will fall short of the severe and 
absolute control that is found when citizens are held in a prison or similar institu-
tion.95 A student is therefore without a remedy if they have the misfortune of 
being functionally under the State’s control rather than fully institutionalized.96 
The majority’s application of the DeShaney test effectively renders the third cat-
egory meaningless.97 
The facts of this particular case should have given rise to a special relation-
ship.98 As Fuentes’s dissent pointed out, Blackhawk High School compelled at-
tendance, exercised extensive control over the victims, and enforced school poli-
cies that prevented Brittany and Emily from being able to take reasonable steps 
to protect themselves.99 The State has near absolute and coercive power over 
students and parents alike in the public school setting.100 In Pennsylvania, chil-
dren between the ages of eight and seventeen are legally required to attend 
school.101 The State enforces the mandatory attendance law by threatening par-
ents whose children do not comply with punishment, including imprisonment.102 
The State’s act of compelling attendance creates power and control over students 
such that students are unable to protect themselves by avoiding the place where 
they face harm.103 If students stay home to protect themselves from a bully at 
their school, they or their parents are subject to penalty.104 
The State has extensive and coercive power to punish students.105 The 
Pennsylvania statute that establishes in loco parentis gives school officials, “the 
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same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils attending . . . school 
. . . as the[ir] parents . . . .”106 The authority of school administrators arises from 
an in loco parentis relationship that is the same as the relationship between a 
parent and child.107 In fact, while a parent can only punish a child, the State can 
bring juvenile detention charges.108 The power of the State to punish a child 
through juvenile detention charges undermines the Morrow majority’s assertion 
that a school has limited power over students.109 The State’s power is extensive 
and coercive.110 
In addition, the Blackhawk School District enforced a “No Tolerance” poli-
cy that swept up and punished both bully and victim.111 In Brittany Morrow’s 
case, she was punished for standing up to her bully.112 Through the enforcement 
of a “No Tolerance” policy that punishes both aggressor and victim alike, the 
school forced Brittany and Emily to decide between protecting themselves and 
succumbing to the bullying.113 The school district essentially eliminated Brittany 
and Emily’s ability to protect themselves.114 
The failure of the Third Circuit to hold school administrators accountable 
for harm done to students creates an incentive for administrators to ignore vio-
lence and bullying rather than stop it.115 Administrators, not parents, are uniquely 
situated to protect students from the harms of bullying inflicted by their peers.116 
It is therefore clear that the Third Circuit should have adopted a functional ap-
proach and, in failing to do so, amplified the harm done to vulnerable stu-
dents. 117 
CONCLUSION 
In failing to find a special relationship between Brittany and Emily Morrow 
and their school, the Third Circuit failed to protect the girls’ Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process rights. More importantly, the court all but eliminated any re-
course for other students who find themselves similarly situated to the Morrows. 
Obligatory attendance laws, in loco parentis, and the threat of punishment to 
both parents and children for truancy should create a special relationship be-
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tween the State and students in limited circumstances. In the Morrows’ case, 
there were specific circumstances that should have created a special relationship. 
First, the bullying and abuse were reported to school officials on numerous occa-
sions. In addition, the school received copies of both stay-away orders issued by 
the municipal court. Finally, the school punished Brittany for standing up for 
herself under the “No Tolerance” policy. The State had clear coercive control to 
such an extent that the Morrows could no longer protect themselves for fear of 
reprisal. 
The Third Circuit had an opportunity to take a stand against bullying. Like 
administrators at the Blackhawk High School, however, the court chose to “pur-
sue inaction.”118 Should other circuits follow this example, bullied students in 
public schools across the United States will suffer the consequences. 
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